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ARBITRATION I 
BLOOD DIAMONDS 
ca1c1ta11d 
sticl{ tactics 
'Blood diamonds' have been financing and fuelling 
armed conflicts that have caused untold human suffering. 
However, an international scheme to stop their trade and 
break their link with rebel movements can be further 
strengthened with the help of ADR. 
By Julie Browne 
and Stuart Sime 
• Looking to appoint an international arbitrator? CIArb·Das can help you find find a suitably qualified 
arbitrator with the right knowledge and experience. 
For any enquiries please contact Waj Khan. 
Tele +44 (0) 207 421 7444. Email wkhan@ciarb.org 
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CONFLICT DIAMONDS HAVE BEEN A MAJOR 
international problem for more than 20 years. 
Also known as 'blood diamonds', they are 
rough diamonds extracted from mines in areas 
controlled by a rebel movement or its allies. 
They are then sold to finance conflict that is 
designed to undermine a legitimate 
government. While the trade in conflict 
diamonds potentially affects almost every 
country in the world, the roots of the problem 
first appeared in Angola, Sierra Leone and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Rough diamond production is big business. 
Mines in various countries (Russia, Canada, 
Australia, and Africa) produce several million 
carats of rough diamonds a year. Regarding 
buyers, there are about 1,500 diamond offices 
in Antwerp. A five-carat rough diamond might 
be worth more than $300 per carat. The UN 
recognises that the vast majority of the 
diamonds produced are from legitimate 
sources and that the legal diamond trade 
makes a critical contribution to the economic 
development of many countries. 
However, in the absence of controls on the 
trade in rough diamonds, a warlord seeking to 
finance a coup against a legitimate government 
would find the temptation of seizing the 
country's diamond fields too great to resist. 
An apt example is the situation in Angola in the 
1990s, where Unita was waging a civil war. It is 
estimated that at that time it controlled 93 per 
cent of the Angolan diamond trade, with a 
value of about $4.3 billion between 1993 and 
1998. That was not, however, the real cost of 
the trade - it's been estimated more than three 
million people were killed in armed conflicts 
funded by the trade in blood diamonds in a 
10-year period at the end of the 20th century. 
Countries must 
sure no 
amond trades 
nanceanY. 
u;roup seel{ing 
ro overthrow 
a government 
Before 2003, sanctions were the principal 
tool used by the UN in seeking to reduce the 
human suffering caused by armed conflict. 
Sanctions were imposed on Uni ta in 1998. 
Sanction-busting, however, was rife. 
It was the realisation that the UN had no 
powers to enforce compliance beyond naming 
and shaming those in breach that led to the 
adoption by the UN General Assembly of 
Resolutions A/RES/55/56 in 2000. These 
supported the creation of an international 
certification scheme for rough diamonds, with 
the aim of preventing conflict diamonds 
entering the legitimate diamond trade and 
thereby removing diamond sales as a source of 
funding for armed conflict. The international 
community was then galvanised into signing 
up to the Kimberley Process (KP) from 
l]anuary 2003. Today, there are 54 
participants, covering 81 countries (the EU 
counts as a single participant), who account for 
99.8 per cent of the world diamond trade. 
The KP was a joint initiative of governments, 
the international diamond industry and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Participating countries must ensure that no 
diamond trades crossing their borders are 
used to finance any group seeldng to 
overthrow a legitimate UN-recognised 
government. They must provide annual 
reports on the amount and value of their 
exports and imports of rough diamonds 
that can be audited. They agree to 
establish a system ofinternal controls 
and every shipment of rough diamonds 
crossing a border has to be accompanied by a 
certificate issued in accordance with the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS). In participating countries, rough 
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diamonds can only be imported from 
and exported to KPCS participating 
countries. Diamond merchants certify on their 
invoices (the System of Warranties) to buyers 
that the diamonds being sold and purchased 
have been obtained from legitimate sources. 
KP certificates can be issued not only by the 
country of origin of the diamonds, but also 
participating countries that are not diamond 
producing countries but that can sell 
diamonds from more than one source, under a 
KP certificate indicating that the diamonds are 
of mixed origin. To prevent any contention 
that the KP could contravene the provisions of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
the General Council of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) granted a waiver in 
respect of the process, and this has recently 
been extended until 31 December 2018. 
Does the KP work? In many ways it is both 
ingenious and inspirational since it had the 
immediate effect of destroying the market in 
conflict diamonds while preserving legitimate 
international trade. For the first few years it 
reduced the volume of conflict diamonds to 
approximately 1 per cent of the world trade in 
rough diamonds. Like many regulatory 
schemes, it was only a matter of time before 
those determined to evade the system started 
to find ways to do so. More recent estimates 
put the trade in conflict diamonds as 
constituting about 4 to 5 per cent of global 
trade, with the fear that this will grow. 
There are four main problems: 
(i) False KPCS certificates 
Although the KPCS requires each certificate 
issued under the process to be resistant to 
forgery there are frequent alerts about fake 
KP certificates. 
(ii) Inadequate enforcement mechanisms 
On an international level, compliance with the 
KPCS by participating countries is overseen by a 
Working Group on Monitoring. A key source of 
information on the extent of compliance is the 
annual report that each participant is required 
to submit. A peer review system of compliance 
exists by which experts and observers can visit 
a participating country and carry out on-the-
spot inspections of mines and processes, but 
this only works if the participating country 
co-operates with these y;i~its. 
Decision-making under the KP is, for the 
most part, carried out by consensus, with a 
search for mutually acceptable solutions in 
relation to contentious issues. In the event 
of an issue regarding compliance by a 
participant, al1'participants are informed and 
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enter into dialogue on how to address it, with 
the chair of the KP mediating the dispute. If 
non-compliance is proved, the defaulting 
country can be asked to leave the scheme. 
Independently of the KP, the UN can also 
impose sanctions on diamond exports from a 
defaulting country. 
At local level, the KP requires participating 
countries to enact legislation to enforce 
compliance with the process by its diamond 
traders. These can impose tough sentences 
for infringement, such as the Canadian 
legislation, which provides for unlimited fines 
and imprisonment for up to 10 years. However 
not all participants police their local laws to 
secure full compliance with the KP with the 
same degree of efficiency. 
(iii) Human rights abuses 
The KP is designed to keep diamonds tainted 
with violence out of international trade. 
However, the purpose of the process is said by 
many to be too narrow. It was not designed to 
cover economic and human rights abuses 
caused by legitimate governments and their 
associated companies. In recent years, NGOs 
such as Global Witness have been reporting 
incidents of extreme violence and state-
sponsored human rights abuses by internal 
security forces against those working in the 
diamond fields, as well as diamond smuggling 
by official entities to neighbouring countries. 
The KP has come under a great deal of 
criticism for not expelling members from the 
KP Certification Scheme. 
(iv) Evading the KP 
One abuse was to obtain conflict diamonds, 
and transfer them to subsidiary companies 
based in countries that provide financial 
secrecy, where they would be mingled with 
diamonds from legitimate sources. Rather like 
money laundering, they were then given a 
KP certificate of mixed origin, and resold at 
full market price. 
So how can the KP be made more effective? 
What is almost certainly needed is a 
'Kimberley Process II', which should aim to 
address the known abuses and which needs to 
have effective enforcement processes that it 
can implement at both international and local 
level. Some such reforms include: addressing 
the legal status of KP (it isn't currently a 
permanent organisation and it doesn't 
constitute a legal agreement or treaty); 
widening the KP so that blood diamonds also 
covers rough diamonds tainted by human 
rights or economic abuses by legitimate 
governments; restricting issue of KP 
certificates to the diamond producing country 
of origin; a clearer decision-making process 
that is not reliant on consensus; making it 
mandatory for cash purchases to be routed 
through official banking channels; a need for a 
system ofregular independent, rigorous, 
mandatory monitoring and auditing of 
participants to ensure effective and full 
compliance; and more effective monitoring 
and compliance at local level by an 
independent body set up in each country. 
However the KP also needs to provide a clear 
and effective way in which international 
disputes between participating countries are 
resolved. This includes disputes about pricing 
and valuation of diamonds, valuation of 
shipments on KP certificates and serious issues 
of non-compliance. The KP could also require 
its participants to sign up to and include a clear 
and binding dispute resolution procedure by 
which internal disputes between the various 
stakeholders, such as enforcing government 
organisations in KP countries, producers, 
suppliers, consumers, mine workers and so 
forth could be resolved. 
A multi-tiered dispute resolution process is 
likely to be most effective for resolving 
disputes both at international and national 
level under the I<PCS. Stage one could consist 
of consultation between the parties to the 
dispute assisted by a skilled independent 
mediator panel drawn from experts in the 
industry with the aim ofreaching a solution by 
consensus. This is similar to the dispute 
resolution mechanisms employed at present, 
but it would provide more formality, clarity 
and independence. In the event that a solution 
by consensus cannot be reached within a set 
timeframe, the parties could bind themselves 
to move to stage two which would involve such 
disputes being referred to arbitration. 
There are existing dispute resolution models 
for dealing with both international and 
internal disputes which can be examined when 
setting up the framework for the creation of a 
binding KP dispute resolution scheme. 
At international level, for dealing with 
disputes between participating members of 
the KP, one model is that used for 
international investment arbitration under 
the Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes. This covers disputes 
that directly relate to financial investments 
where the parties are a member state and an 
investor in another member state. While most 
of the cases dealt with by the International 
Centre for Settlement oflnvestment Disputes 
are resolved through arbitration, it also deals 
with a number of cases by conciliation. 
Another useful model is the WTO's 
Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, which 
provides for a multi-tiered dispute resolution 
model for disputes arising under one of the 
covered WTO trade agreements. These 
include adjudicated decisions by three or five 
member panels appointed by the WTO's 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) when a 
settlement cannot be achieved by 
consultation and mediation at the first stage, 
with a final appeal process to the Appellate 
Body. In addition to the panels and the 
Appellate Body, disputes can also be resolved 
by arbitrators, although arbitration results are 
not appealable to the Appellate Body. The 
losing party is then given time to bring its 
offending trade policies into line with the 
rulings and recommendations of the DSB, and 
if it fails to act within the agreed period, 
compensation will usually be payable, 
although other sanctions can be imposed 
such as blocking imports or exports of goods. 
Arbitration can also be employed after a DSB 
ruling to decide issues such as the time that 
should be given for compliance, or penalties 
that should be imposed for the offending 
party's failure to comply with a DSB decision. 
At local level, in respect ofinternal disputes 
arising out of implementation of the KP within 
Arbitration can 
be emnI,1 ect 
att~raD 
ruling to ecide 
the time gjven 
for compliance 
participating states, a useful procedure from 
which lessons could be learned is the arbitration 
commission established by the Federation of 
Belgian Diamond Bourses to oversee KP 
compliance by its members, which gives the 
commission power to refer suspected breaches 
to a panel of arbitrators to make a 
determination. The London Diamond Bourse 
(LDB) has required its members to adopt a 
code of conduct that provides for a similar 
dispute resolution model, with an Arbitration 
Commission set out by the LDB. This oversees 
compliance with the KP by its members, with 
the power to refer suspected violations to a 
panel of arbitrators (the Code Board) for 
determination, with the parties having a right 
to appeal arbitration decisions to a Code 
Appeal Board. 
Working out the parameters of a bespoke 
arbitration-based dispute resolution process 
for alleged breaches of the KP will need a 
great deal of care. An independent 
commission, empowered to monitor 
compliance and investigate potential 
breaches, and to refer cases to the arbitral 
tribunal, would be required both at national 
and international level. The arbitrators 
themselves could be drawn from experts in 
the diamond industry or appointed by a body 
such as the World Diamond Council. By giving 
a KP arbitration panel the power to make 
financial awards, a workable arbitration scheme 
might be possible. The nature of the financial 
award would depend on the circumstances of 
the case. Where the respondent is an individual 
or business who is found to be in breach of the 
KPCS, the financial award could be determined 
by reference to the value of the diamonds, or 
the profits from the transaction. The arbitral 
tribunal might also be given the power to order 
the delivery up of the diamonds. Financial 
awards by arbitrators are well understood 
around the world, and readily enforceable 
under the New York Convention 1958. 
Machinery would also be needed for dealing 
with any sums recovered. With awards based on 
the value of the diamonds or the profits 
generated, the funds generated might be used first 
to fund the arbitral service, then the KP itself, and 
then perhaps to conflict related UN projects. 
While it should be possible to bind the 
participants to the KP and the key players 
operating internally in each country within the 
KP to a two-tier dispute resolution model, it 
will not of course work for parties who operate 
outside the KP such as those involved in illicit 
trading in conflict diamonds for the direct 
purpose of funding civil wars or insurrections. 
Each country therefore needs to have in place 
an effective criminal code and a system of 
uniform criminal sanctions for those who flout 
domestic criminal law. 
Consideration should also be given to 
whether it is necessary to set up an 
international court, or to extend the jurisdiction 
of the International Court of Justice or the 
International Criminal Court. Agreeing the text 
for the necessary treaty, setting up such a court, 
and obtaining ratifications from the key 
countries in the diamond trade would obviously 
be a massive undertaking. 
In conclusion, the KP has achieved a great 
deal in the past 10 years ofits operation. 
However, reforms are now needed so that it 
continues to meet the present challenges, 
including strong and independent monitoring 
and mandatory, effective dispute resolution 
mechanisms for dealing with issues of 
non-compliance at both international and 
national level. 
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